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**Seventh Report**

**COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF  
THE VIETNAM AND LAOS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS**

(This report covers the week from  
30 March through 5 April 1973)

*This memorandum has been prepared jointly by the  
Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense*


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**Eighth Report**


**COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF  
THE VIETNAM AND LAOS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS**

(This report covers the week from  
6 April through 12 April 1973)

*This memorandum has been prepared jointly by the  
Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense*

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6 April 1973

Seventh Report

COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF  
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The Key Points

- North Vietnamese military supplies continued to move through southern Laos toward and into South Vietnam, and the volume of supplies entering Laos at the top of the Ho Chi Minh trail system was somewhat above last week's level.
- Extremely heavy North Vietnamese logistic activity continued throughout the week in Quang Tri Province of South Vietnam.
- The number of combat incidents initiated by the Communists remained at a moderate level in South Vietnam and at a low level in Laos.

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The Details

NOTE: This is the seventh in a series of reports detailing recently received evidence of (a) Communist efforts to infiltrate new manpower and military materiel toward and into South Vietnam, and (b) Communist-instigated combat activity in violation of the Vietnam and Laos settlement agreements. [REDACTED]

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B. Movement of Military Equipment and Supplies Toward and Into South Vietnam and Laos

4. North Vietnamese logistic activity in southern Laos and South Vietnam continued during the week at the same high levels detected throughout March. Heavy vehicle activity was observed over the length of the Laos Panhandle, the greatest traffic volumes occurring west of the A Shau Valley

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and in the tri-border area. From these locations, NVA logistic units shipped large quantities of military supplies toward the central and southern parts of South Vietnam. Within South Vietnam itself, NVA logistic units also continued to move large quantities of materiel into and out of supply bases in Quang Tri Province. The major logistic buildup of the Communists in this area equals or exceeds the buildup which was observed just before and during the North Vietnamese offensive of 1972.


5. On the entry corridors from North Vietnam into the Laos Panhandle, truck traffic moving southward through the passes increased slightly over the previous week's level. Within southern North Vietnam itself, we received little new evidence during the week of southbound logistic movements, but our coverage in this area is weak. At the same time, we did continue to detect substantial supply shipments from North Vietnam to northern Laos.

6. The following instances of Communist logistic activity were observed in South Vietnam during the reporting period. Activity observed in South Vietnam probably reflects supplies which have recently entered the country. (The map on the following page shows the roads and route numbers which appear below.)

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- (b) On 31 March, 137 cargo trucks were observed along Route 9 in western Quang Tri Province. Some were headed east; some were headed west.
- (c) In the Khe Sanh area, 23 cargo vehicles were observed halted on Route 608 (north of Khe Sanh) and 30 cargo vehicles dispersed along Route 616 (to the south) on 31 March.
- (d) On 3 April, 18 cargo trucks were observed moving west on Route 9 in the Khe Sanh area. There were also 65 North Vietnamese cargo vehicles--35 of them parked--on Route 608 north of Khe Sanh on the same day.
- (e) On 3 April, 27 southbound cargo vehicles were observed on Route 1033 in the western DMZ, and a total of 98 cargo vehicles moved south over this route during the period 30 March through 5 April. Also in this area, 14 northbound cargo trucks were seen on Route 1032B on 3 April.

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
7. During the reporting period the following indications of North Vietnamese logistic activity in north and south Laos and northeastern Cambodia

were noted. Historical precedent would suggest that much of the activity in the Laos Panhandle and Cambodia probably involved supplies destined for South Vietnam. 25X1



- (b) From 29 March through 1 April, at least 370 vehicles were observed moving

in the southern Laos Panhandle.



- (e) On 31 March, ten NVA cargo trucks were observed halted on Route 23 south of Mu Gia Pass.
- (f) On 3 April, 26 southbound cargo trucks were observed on Route 912 southwest of the Ban Karai Pass. During the period 30 March through 5 April, 258 northbound and 259 southbound trucks were observed transiting the Pass.

(g) On 5 April, heavy truck movement was observed on routes 99 and 920 in the central Laos Panhandle. In all, over 200 NVA trucks were seen, of which more than half were loaded and heading south. This is the highest level of activity observed in this area since 12 March.

8. There is additional evidence of the continuing movement within North Vietnam of military and other supplies which are probably destined for South Vietnam and northern Laos.

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C. Combat Activity Instigated by Communist Forces  
In South Vietnam Since the Ceasefire

9. In South Vietnam, the total number of Communist-initiated ceasefire violations reported by the South Vietnamese Armed Forces since 28 January and for the last week (30 March - 5 April) are shown below:

Military Region	Total Since Ceasefire Level of Action		Last Week (30 Mar-5 Apr) Level of Action	
	Major	Minor	Major	Minor
MR 1	686	2,455	33	107
MR 2	172	1,038	7	116
MR 3	225	1,489	28	93
MR 4	336	3,123	34	281
Totals	1,419	8,105	102 (118) <u>1/</u>	597 (527) <u>1/</u>

1/ Denotes totals of previous week.

10. Some of these violations may have been initiated by GVN forces rather than Communist forces, and it is impossible in all cases to determine the actual instigator. The table above and the chart on the following page, however, do show fairly accurately the trend in the amount of combat that has occurred in South Vietnam since the ceasefire. The fact that a combat incident occurred at a particular time and place is generally reported accurately by the South Vietnamese, even though the question of who started it may not always be treated in objective fashion. In some cases, the Joint Military Commission (GVN/PRG) also reports violations of the ceasefire.

11. The following is a chronological listing of only the most significant "major" Communist violations of the ceasefire in South Vietnam that were reported by the South Vietnamese Armed Forces during the past week.

#### MILITARY REGION 1

- (a) On 2 April, west and southwest of Hue a total of 270 82-mm mortar rounds were directed against ARVN infantry units.




## CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM AS REPORTED BY RVNAF

(28 JANUARY 1973 TO THE PRESENT)


Red line ....Total violations

Black line ..Major violations


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
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- (b) On 2 April, elements of the 1st ARVN Division west and southwest of Hue, received a total of 396 rounds of mixed ordnance.
- (c) On 4 April, 10 miles west of Hue, elements of an ARVN infantry battalion received an enemy ABF of 785 rounds of mixed ordnance.

MILITARY REGION 2

- (a) On 31 March, 15 miles southwest of Pleiku, an element of an ARVN ranger battalion was hit by an ABF of 500 mixed 60-mm/82-mm mortar rounds.

MILITARY REGION 3

- (a) On 29 and 30 March, enemy elements fired a total of 519 rounds of mixed ordnance during four attacks by fire into the Tonle Cham Base Camp eight miles southwest of An Loc.
- (b) On 30 March, enemy forces attacked an element of an ARVN infantry battalion 16 miles southwest of Lao Khe.
- (c) On 30 and 31 March, Tonle Cham Base Camp received 256 rounds of mixed ordnance.
- (d) On 1 April, Tonle Cham Base Camp received an ABF of 275 rounds of mixed ordnance.
- (e) On 2 and 3 April, the Tonle Cham Base Camp received 495 artillery and mortar rounds.
- (f) On 3 and 4 April, the Tonle Cham Base Camp received 231 rounds of mixed ordnance.

- (g) On 4 April, four miles west-southwest of Song Be, elements of an ARVN ranger border defense battalion received an enemy ground attack.
- (h) On 4 April, five miles southeast of Tay Ninh City, elements of an RF battalion received an enemy ABF of 100 mortar rounds followed by a ground assault.

#### MILITARY REGION 4

- (a) On 3 April, 18 miles northeast of Chau Doc, enemy forces attacked elements of an ARVN armored cavalry squadron and an infantry battalion.
- (b) On 4 April, 10 miles northeast of Vinh Long, elements of an ARVN infantry battalion received an enemy ground attack.

#### D. Combat Activity Initiated by Communist Forces In Laos During the Week From 30 March through 5 April

12. During the week, significant Communist-initiated incidents were recorded in the Ban Houei Sai area of Laos Military Region I, southeast of the Plain of Jars in MR-II, and in the area between Khong Sedone and Saravane in MR-IV. Minor skirmishing continued near several contested villages south of Thakhek in MR-III.

13. Activity in all other areas of Laos remained at a low level, although there have been recent indications of Communist preparations to launch major attacks against Government forces southeast of the Plain and at the Sala Phou Khoun road junction in MR-II. There is strong evidence that elements of a North Vietnamese Army regiment have moved southeastward



from the Plain and are preparing to attack Government forces which thus far have thwarted Communist efforts to reopen Route 4 south of Xieng Khouangville. There is also evidence that local Pathet Lao and Dissident Neutralist forces intend to attack the Route 7/13 intersection at Sala Phou Khoun in the near future, although their ability to capture and hold this road junction is questionable.

14. Following is a brief account of significant combat incidents which occurred between 30 March and 5 April and which were clearly initiated by Communist forces in violation of the Laos ceasefire agreement:

- (a) On 30 March, North Vietnamese Army forces conducted an attack-by-fire and a two-company ground attack against a Royal Lao Army (FAR) position near the former Royal Lao Government irregular base at Pha Dong, southeast of the Plain of Jars. The FAR defenders were forced to withdraw from the position.
- (b) On 31 March, there was a low level of military activity throughout Laos.
- (c) On 1 April, there was no significant activity countrywide.
- (d) On 2 April, again there was no significant activity throughout Laos.
- (e) On 3 April, the position of a RLG battalion northeast of Khong Sedone in MR-IV was attacked by an estimated Communist battalion supported by approximately 350 rounds of mortar fire. The RLG force deployed in this sector also received about 160 rounds of mortar fire in its regimental command post area. Despite the reported intensity of this action,

casualties were light and RLG forces apparently lost no positions. A series of Communist ground and mortar attacks against a RLG battalion located north of Ban Houei Sai in MR-I forced the friendly unit to withdraw 20 kilometers westward to the Mekong River, and possibly across it into Burma.

- (f) On 4 April, only light contact was reported throughout Laos.
- (g) On 5 April, again only light activity was reported.

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